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Big Lagoon Rancheria v. State of California, Nos. 10-17803, 10-17878, ___ F. 
3d ___, 2015 WL 3499884, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9312 (9th Cir. June 4, 
2015) (en banc) 
 
Wesley J. Furlong 
 
The Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion in Big Lagoon Rancheria v. 
California is, thus far, perhaps the most important Indian law decision in 2015. 
Rejecting its three-judge panel’s opinion, the Ninth Circuit, en banc, affirmed the 
importance of defending tribal sovereignty against invidious state actions. The 
court denounced California’s use of Carcieri to de-recognize the Big Lagoon 
Rancheria and rescind the trust status of its land, characterizing it as “a belated 
collateral attack” on the Tribe and an “end-run” around the APA. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California concerned whether the State of 
California (“State”) could invoke Carcieri v. Salazar
1
 to invalidate the Secretary 
of the Interior’s (“Secretary”) decision to take an eleven-acre parcel of land into 
trust for the Big Lagoon Rancheria (“Tribe”), eighteen years after the 
entrustment.
2
 Sitting en banc, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit found that Carcieri did not provide the State with standing to challenge 
the entrustment of the Tribe’s land.
3
 The Ninth Circuit held that the State’s 
challenge to the Secretary’s decision to take an eleven-acre parcel of land into 
trust represented merely “‘a garden-variety’” Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”) claim, not a substantive challenge to an agency action.
4
 The court 
decried the State’s challenge to the entrustment as “a belated collateral attack” on 
the Tribe.
5
 Indeed, the court viewed the State’s suit as an “end-run” around the 




The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) provides the framework 
by which gaming within Indian country is regulated.
7
 The IGRA was passed 
because tribes, as sovereign nations, were not subject to state gaming 
regulations.
8
 The IGRA requires tribes and states to enter into compacts 
                                                 
1
  Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009). 
2
  Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, Nos. 10-17803, 10-17878, ___ F.3d ___, 
2015 WL 3499884, at *3 (9th Cir. June 4, 2015) (en banc) [hereinafter Big Lagoon V]. 
3
  Id. at *4. 
4
  Id. (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. 
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (2012)). 
5
  Id.  
6
  Id. at *5 
7
  See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1166-1168 (1988). 
8
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concerning the regulation of class III gaming,
9
thus creating “a ‘cooperative 
federalis[t]’ framework” for the regulation of gaming.
10
 The IGRA mandates that 
states negotiate these compacts in good faith with tribes.
11
 Gaming facilities must 
be located on “Indian lands.”
12
 Under the IGRA, Indian lands means “any land 
within the limits of any Indian reservation . . . [and] any lands . . . held in trust by 
the Unites States.”
13
 The Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”)
14
 grants the 
Secretary the authority to take land in to trust “for the purpose of providing land 
for Indians.”
15
 The IRA was passed in 1934 to provide tribes with the tools 
necessary to promote tribal self-governance and self-determination.  
Carcieri has severely curtailed the Secretary’s authority to take land in to 
trust for many tribes. In 2009, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that 
the Secretary could not acquire land to be held in trust for tribes which were not 
federally recognized in 1934 – the year the IRA was passed.
16
 Carcieri involved 
the State of Connecticut’s APA challenge to the Secretary’s decision to take land 
into trust for the Narragansett Tribe.
17
 The Supreme Court ruled that the phrase 
“now under Federal Jurisdiction” in § 19 of the IRA
18
 “unambiguously” extends 
the benefits of the IRA – and in particular 25 U.S.C. § 465 – only “to those tribes 
that were under the federal jurisdiction of the Unite States when the IRA was 
enacted in 1934.”
19
 Since the Narragansett Tribe was not “under Federal 
jurisdiction” in 1934, the Supreme Court determined the Secretary’s entrustment 




II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
  
  The Big Lagoon Rancheria, a federally recognized Indian tribe in 
Northern California, consists of two adjacent parcels of land.
21
 The Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (“BIA”) purchased a nine-acre parcel for James Charley in 1918.
22
 
Charley was an Indian, and following his death, the family moved off the land.
23
 
                                                 
9
  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C), (3)(A). “Class III gaming . . . involves ‘the types of 
high-stakes games usually associated with Nevada-style gambling.’” Big Lagoon V, 2015 WL 
3499884, at *1 (quoting In re Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
10
  Big Lagoon V, 2015 WL 3499884, at *1 (bracket in original). 
11
  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
12
  Id. at § 2710(d)(1). 
13
  Id. at § 2703(4). 
14
  25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1934). 
15
  Id. at § 465. 
16
  Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 395. 
17
  Id. at 385. 
18
  25 U.S.C. § 479 (“The term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall include all persons 
of Indian decent who are members of any recognized tribe now under federal jurisdiction, and 
all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within 
the present boundaries of any Indian reservation.” Id. (emphasis added)). 
19
  Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 395. 
20
  Id. at 385. 
21
  Big Lagoon V, 2015 WL 3499884, at *2. 
22
  Id. 
23
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Robert Charley, one of Charley’s sons, was thought to have lived on the land 
between 1942 and 1946; otherwise, the land sat vacant.
24
 Sometime later, Robert 
Charley’s nephew obtained permission from the BIA to camp on the land.
25
 The 
nephew viewed the land as a Rancheria, as in 1967 they applied for dissolution 
and termination under the California Rancheria Termination Act.
26
 The Big 
Lagoon Rancheria first appeared as a federally recognized tribe in 1979.
27
  
In 1994, the Secretary acquired an eleven-acre parcel of land adjacent to 
the original parcel and placed it in to trust.
28
 In an attempt to establish a class III 
gaming facility on the eleven-acre parcel, the Tribe entered into exhaustive 
negotiations with the State.
29
 When negotiations broke down in 1999, the Tribe 
sued, alleging that the State had negotiated in bad faith.
30
 The Tribe and the State 
settled in 2005, and negotiated a compact that allowed the tribe to build a casino 
and hotel.
31
 However, in 2007, the State legislature failed to ratify the compact.
32
 
New negotiations proved futile, and in 2009 the Tribe brought this case, again 
alleging the State had negotiated in bad faith.   
  Initially, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California ruled in favor of the Tribe.
33
 On appeal, a three-judge panel of the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court.
34
 Relying on Carcieri, the panel found 
that since the tribe was not “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934, the entrustment 
of the eleven-acre parcel was invalid.
35
 Accordingly, the court determined that 





III.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  Carciere v. Salazar: Administrative or Substantive Challenge? 
 
Citing Carcieri, the Ninth Circuit originally determined that since the 
Tribe did not appear under Federal Jurisdiction until 1979, it could not have land 
taken into trust by the Secretary.
37
 The Tribe argued that the State needed to 
                                                 
24
  Id. 
25
  Id. 
26
  Id. (discussing Pub. L. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619 (1958)). 
27
  Id.; see Indian Tribal Entities that Have a Government-to-Government 
Relationship with the United States, 44 Fed. Reg. 7235 (Feb. 6, 1979). 
28
  Big Lagoon V, 2015 WL 3499884, at *2. 
29
  Id. at **2-3. 
30
  Id. at *3. 
31
  Id.  
32
  Id.  
33
  Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
[hereinafter Big Lagoon I]. 
34
  Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 741 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2014) [hereinafter 
Big Lagoon III]. 
35
  Id. at 1044-45. 
36
  Id. at 1045. 
37
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challenge the entrustment as a final agency action under the APA.
38
 Since the 
six-year APA statute of limitations had expired, the Tribe argued the State’s 
challenge was untimely.
39
 The thee-judge panel disagreed. 
 
“[S]ubstantive challenges to agency action–for example, claims 
that agency action is unconstitutional, that it exceeds the scope of 
the agency’s substantive authority, or that it is premised on an 




Finding the entrustment exceeded the Secretary’s “substantive authority, the 
court allowed the State’s challenge, even after the statute of limitations expired.
41
  
  However, en banc, the Ninth Circuit firmly rejected this interpretation.
42
 
The court distinguished the present case from Carcieri, noting Carcieri had 
“involved a timely administrative challenge” to the Secretary’s entrustment of 
thirty-one acres for the Narragansett Tribe.
43
 The court stated that Carcieri did 
not address whether the secretary’s entrustment of land can be challenged outside 
the APA and after the expiration of the statute of limitations.
44
  
  The court determined that a challenge to the Secretary’s entrustment of 
land “is ‘a garden-variety APA claim.’”
45
 The court stated that “[t]he proper 
vehicle” to challenge the Sectary’s action “is a petition for review pursuant to the 
APA.”
46
 The court emphasized that the State had not challenged the entrustment 
under the APA.
47
 The court viewed “[t]he instant case [as] a belated collateral 
attack” on the Tribe and an “end-run” around the APA.
48
 The Court stated that 
the State could not use “‘collateral proceedings to end-run the procedural 
requirements’” of the APA.
49
 The court noted that regardless of the claim being 




B.  Further Holdings 
 
The court also dismissed the State’s challenge to the tribe’s Federal 
recognition.
51
 While the court acknowledging “that it [was] unclear” how the 
                                                 
38
  Id. at 1042. 
39
  Id. 
40
  Id. at 1043 (quoting Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., 449 F.3d 286, 293 
(2d Cir. 2005)) (emphasis added). 
41
  Id.  
42
  Big Lagoon V, 2015 WL 3499884, at **4-5. 
43
  Id. *4. 
44
  Id.  
45
  Id. (quoting Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2208). 
46
  Id.  
47
  Id. at *5. 
48
  Id. **4, 5 (emphasis added). 
49
  Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Backlund, 689 F.3d 986, 1000 (9th Cir. 
2012)). 
50
  Id.  
51
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Tribe gained federal recognition, it noted that the State had not brought an APA 
challenge to the Secretary’s recognition of the Tribe.
52
 The court also dismissed 
the State’s challenge of the district court’s refusal to grant a continuance to put 
off compact negotiations until the case was ultimately resolved.
53
 The Ninth 
Circuit found that a continuance might have been appropriate if the State had 
filed a timely APA challenge.
54
 Since the Tribe was “properly recognized,” the 
court determined that the properness of the entrustment was “irrelevant” in the 
context of determining if the State had negotiated in bad faith.
55
 The Ninth 
Circuit additionally dismissed the Tribe’s claims against the State on appeal as 
moot.
56
 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgement, determining that the State had not negotiated in good faith, 




IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
En banc, the Ninth Circuit firmly rejected the notion that Carcieri 
provides states with a collateral attack on the very sovereignty of tribes. While 
the en banc opinion relies on a highly textual reading of Carcieri and the APA, 
its broad implications cannot be downplayed. Carcieri represents a serious 
challenge to smaller, newer recognized tribes, by failing to take into 
consideration the history of the systematic termination of tribes throughout 
United States. Indeed, the IRA was past as a tool to promote tribal self-
governance and self-determination. Carcieri’s holding circumscribes recently 
recognized tribes’ sovereignty. The Ninth Circuit, however, recognized the 
reality these tribes face in asserting self-governance and fostering economic 
development. The court recognized that such collateral attacks “would cast doubt 
over countless acres of land that have been taken into trust for tribes recognized 
by the federal government.”
58
 The en banc opinion has the potential to protect 
numerous tribes from such collateral attacks. Indeed, Alabama is currently 
attempting to use Carcieri and Big Lagoon III to halt the ongoing gaming 
operations of three casinos owned by the Poarch Band of Creek Indian.
59
 
Alabama’s attempt was not successful with the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Alabama.
60
 Alabama’s appeal is pending before the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
                                                 
52
  Id. 
53
  Id. at * 5-6. 
54
  Id. at *6. 
55
  Id. (discussing Big Lagoon I, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 1160). 
56
  Id. 
57
  Id. at *7. 
58
  Id. at *5. 
59
  See Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 15 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1182-84 (M.D. Ala. 
2014); see Appellant’s Br. at 27-30, Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 2014 WL 3389116 (11th 
Cir. July 7, 2014) (No.14-12004-DD). 
60
  PCI Gaming, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1183-84. 
